

# Modeling Internet-Scale Policies for Cleaning up Malware

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## Abstract

An emerging consensus among policy makers is that interventions undertaken by Internet Service Providers are the best way to counter the rising incidence of malware. However, assessing the suitability of countermeasures at this scale is hard. In this paper, we use an agent-based model, called ASIM, to investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet. For instance, we find that coordinated intervention by the 0.2%-biggest ASes is more effective than uncoordinated efforts adopted by 30% of all ASes. Furthermore, countermeasures that block malicious transit traffic appear more effective than ones that block outgoing traffic. The model allows us to quantify and compare positive externalities created by different countermeasures. Our results give an initial indication of the types and levels of intervention that are most cost-effective at large scale.

## 1 Introduction

Many Internet-connected computers are infected with malicious software, or *malware*. Malware can harm the infected computer user directly, for example, by installing a keystroke logger to collect confidential information surreptitiously. It can also place the machine into a botnet consisting of thousands or even millions of computers that carry out attacks of the operator's choosing, such as sending email spam or launching denial-of-service attacks. Infected machines can also become vectors for further malware spread, as in the case of Conficker, which initiates attacks from infected machines to recruit new computers to the botnet [28].

In economic terms, malware imposes negative externalities by harming innocent third parties [3]. Neg-

ative externalities are a form of market failure, which suggests that there will be an oversupply of the resource (in this case, malware) in equilibrium. Policy makers are interested in correcting this market failure to reduce the social cost of malware. Although many stakeholders could potentially help control the spread of malware, the emerging consensus is that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are best positioned to intervene [24, 2, 33].

It is less clear, however, what kind of intervention is most appropriate. The possibilities range from simply notifying infected customers to actively quarantining them until the malware has been demonstrably removed. It is difficult to gauge the impact of policies and ISP-level interventions until they have been tried, and it is expensive (both financially and in terms of political capital) to adopt industry-wide policies. Consequently, it is important to get it right the first time.

One way to address this issue is through modeling. In this paper we model potential intervention strategies for controlling malware and compare their likely impact. We use an agent-based model called ASIM [17], which represents the Internet at the autonomous system (AS) level, the level at which policy interventions are being actively considered. ASIM incorporates traffic, which is key to understanding the spread of malware, geography, which is key to investigating country-level effects, and economics, which is key to understanding the cost and benefits of interventions.

Through a series of experiments we study several questions, reporting some findings that are unsurprising and others that are counterintuitive. For example, our experiments show, as we would expect, that a few of the largest ISPs acting in concert are more effective than a randomly chosen subset of all ASes

intervening unilaterally. However, the numbers involved are more surprising: Intervention by the top 0.2% of ASes is more effective than intervention by 30% of ASes chosen at random. Our results also suggest that when only the largest ASes intervene, it is better to simply filter out malicious traffic (especially transit traffic) than to attempt to remediate end-user infections. We also explore briefly the impact of interventions on the growth of the network, and demonstrate that policies that are beneficial in the short term could be harmful in the long-term. For example, the collateral damage caused by blacklisting malicious traffic sources promotes those ASes that profit from receiving more malicious traffic.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review in greater detail the policy interventions currently under consideration worldwide in Section 2. In Section 3, we explain how ASIM works and how the cybersecurity interventions are implemented. In Section 4 we describe how we empirically validated ASIM, and Section 5 reports experimental results. We discuss related work in Section 6 and the findings and limitations in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.

## 2 Policy Interventions

There are several reasons why ISPs are a promising point of intervention. First, ISPs are the gatekeeper to the Internet for many computers and thus in a unique position to inspect traffic to and from their customers. Infections are often detected remotely by scanning for outgoing connections to known command-and-control servers used by botnet operators [21]. In this scenario, only the ISP can link an IP address to customer details, a crucial step if customers are to be notified and assisted.

A second reason is that ample opportunity exists for reducing the prevalence of malware by enlisting the help of ISPs. Using several years' worth of data on computers sending spam (a natural proxy for botnet activity), van Eeten et al. [33] found that most compromised computers were customers of legitimate ISPs, and that infection rates vary dramatically across ISPs and countries. Their evidence suggests that differences in security countermeasures, not merely target selection by attackers, can affect infection rates at ISPs.

However, incentives for ISPs to implement security countermeasures are weak. As mentioned above, much of the harm caused by malware is externalized, but the cost of intervention would fall largely on the

ISP. Although the infected host is often unharmed by malware, the ISP is definitely not directly harmed. However, the cost of notification and cleanup can be substantial. According to an OECD study, one medium-sized ISP reported that it spent 1–2 % of its total revenue handling security-related support calls [32]. Thus, there is a strong disincentive for ISPs to notify infected customers and also pay for any resulting support calls.

Despite weak incentives, ISPs in many countries have begun exploring a variety of remedial interventions, either with government cooperation or to preempt the imposition of more burdensome regulatory requirements. Interventions by ISPs usually do not include the detection of malware, only remediation once malware is detected. For notifications of misbehaving or compromised customers, ISPs rely on third parties, such as the operators of email blacklists, botnet trackers, other ISPs and security companies,

Once a threat is identified, most ISPs choose to do nothing, waiting until the abuse team has time to act or for additional warnings about the customer to accrue. However, some ISPs have begun to notify customers. In the US, Comcast automatically notifies customers of infections with a browser pop-up that links to instructions for removing the malware [10]. The customers are responsible for completing the clean-up process, and it is inevitable that not all malware will be removed successfully even after notification. As a further step, Comcast has partnered with Symantec to offer remediation by a skilled technician for \$100. A similar approach is being rolled out by Australian ISPs [6].

A more aggressive step is to place infected computers into “quarantine.” Once in quarantine, users are required to download and install anti-virus software and malware removal tools. They leave the quarantine only after the security software is installed and the computer passes a network-based scan for malware. Quarantine is considerably more expensive than the notification-only approaches, and the ISPs that use them do so only for a minority of affected customers. Recently, the Dutch ISPs announced a signed agreement to notify and quarantine affected customers [13].

Both ISPs and policy makers have realized that tackling widespread infection can be made more effective if ISPs coordinate their interventions. In both the Dutch and Australian case, many ISPs have joined together in common action, prodded by their governments. This collective action is designed in

part to allay the fear that customers might switch providers rather than fix the underlying problem.

Some countries are weighing more active intervention. If the cost of customer support is really the greatest impediment to ISP action, then the German government’s decision to establish and subsidize a nationwide call center could really help [18]. Under this plan, ISPs will identify infected customers and pass along the information to the call center. Clayton describes a proposal under consideration by Luxembourg to subsidize the cost of voluntary cleanup whenever a customer has been notified of infection [9]. Instead of such “carrot”-based incentives, “sticks” could also be tried. Anderson et al. recommended that the European Commission introduce fixed penalties for ISPs that do not expeditiously comply with notifications of compromised machines present on their networks [2].

Finally, policy makers could coordinate their defenses by aggregating notifications of infection. A survey of Dutch ISPs revealed that they notify or quarantine only about 10% of infected customers [31] even though they claim to notify all customers known to be infected. This occurs because their individual lists of infections are incomplete. Data incompleteness is a widespread problem in information security [23], as firms often jealously guard their incident information as trade secrets. To combat this trend, the Australian Internet Security Initiative now aggregates data on compromised machines into a single feed and passes it along to Australian ISPs [6].

### 3 Model Description

ASIM [17] is an agent-based model of Internet growth at the Autonomous System (AS) level. ASes roughly correspond to ISPs. While there are differences between ASes and ISPs (e.g., a single ISP can use several AS numbers), more extensive and reliable data is available describing ASes than ISPs. This eases empirical validation and explains why most of the literature has studied Internet topology at the AS level. We summarize the important features of ASIM here, highlighting differences between the original implementation and the version used in this paper.

ASIM is based on highly simplified implementations of four key features of ASes: network structure, traffic flow, geography, and economics. These features are sufficient to enable ASIM to generate networks with topologies, dynamics, and spatial distributions similar to those of the Internet. There are conceptual similarities between ASIM and some ear-

lier Internet models such as HOT [8, 7], although many of the details are different. For example, ASIM adds explicit economic considerations and accounts directly for population density.

ASIM attempts to reproduce large-scale features of the AS level of the Internet by modeling localized and well-understood network interactions. Instead of simply reproducing a macroscopic pattern using statistical fitting or phenomenological models, ASIM specifies a set of primitive components (the agents) and interaction rules that mimic the architecture of the real system. The model is run as a simulation, and macroscopic behaviors (e.g., degree distribution) are observed and compared to real-world data. The objective is to provide a parsimonious explanation of how a system works by hypothesizing a small set of simple but relevant mechanisms.

In ASIM each AS is an economic agent, which manages traffic over a geographically extended network (referred to as a *sub-network* to distinguish it from the network of ASes) and profits from the traffic that flows through its network. We assume a network user population distributed over a two-dimensional grid of locations. Traffic is generated between source and destination with a probability that is a function of the population profile. The model is initialized with one agent that spans one grid location. At each time step a new agent is added to a single location. As time progresses, each agent may extend its sub-network to other locations, so that the sub-networks reach a larger fraction of the population. This creates more traffic, which generates profit, which is then reinvested into further network expansion. In addition, agents link to each other, potentially routing traffic between sub-networks other than their own. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for two agents to be connected is that they overlap in at least one location. Through positive feedback, the network grows until it covers the entire population.

For this paper, we have reimplemented ASIM in order to make it run efficiently in parallel.<sup>1</sup> In the process, we have simplified the model, without reducing the accuracy with which the model simulates AS-like networks. The major changes are described below.

#### 3.1 Simplifying the Original ASIM

In the original model described in Holme et al. [17], a variable number of agents could be added every time step, sufficient to maintain the correct average

<sup>1</sup>Code available at <http://ftg.lbl.gov/projects/asim>.

degree. In the new model, we simply add one agent per iteration, regardless. This follows realistic observed growth curves where the number of new agents grows at an almost perfectly linear rate. In our analysis of the real world data, we find that about 5.5 new ASes are added per day, so in our simulation, one time step is the equivalent of approximately 4.4 hours. Each new agent is added to a single, already occupied location<sup>2</sup>, chosen at random (weighted according to population).

Instead of a packet-switched model, we use the gravity model [16]. For the gravity model, the traffic flow  $T$  between a pair of agents A and B is

$$T(A, B) = \frac{pop(A)pop(B)}{d(A, B)^2}$$

where,  $pop(A)$  is the population served by A,  $pop(X)$  is the population served by B, and  $d(A, B)$  is the shortest path distance on the AS graph from A to B. Once we have determined the flow between A and B, we propagate it across the graph on the shortest path and every agent along that path gets its count of traffic increased accordingly. If there are multiple shortest paths, we randomly choose one. This traffic flow computation is performed for every pair of agents.

The traffic model is run every 16 time steps, corresponding to every three days of simulation time. Computing paths and carrying out traffic flow is expensive and most paths do not change significantly in the short term. We find experimentally that running the traffic model every 16 time steps provides a good balance between computational overhead and maintaining accuracy. Note that there is no notion of capacity, as there was in the original model.

There are two major differences in the modeling of geography. First, we disregard geographic distance, i.e. the cost of expanding to a new location is constant, regardless of where an agent expands to. By contrast, in the original model, the greater the distance from an agent's existing locations to a new location, the higher the cost of expansion. Second, in the new ASIM, an agent expands to a randomly chosen location, weighted by populace, regardless of how many other agents exist at that location. This differs from the original model, where the location chosen was the one with the highest shared<sup>3</sup> population within reach.

<sup>2</sup>Except for the very first agent, of course.

<sup>3</sup>The population of the location, divided by the number of agents with presence at that location.

The mechanism for earning revenue in the new implementation is very similar to the original model. In the original model, an agent earns money for every packet it transits. In the new ASIM, we do not have a packet-switched model, and so an agent simply earns money every iteration proportional to the volume of traffic that it transits in either direction.

It does not cost an agent to link, unlike in the original model. There are two circumstances in which new links are added. First, when a new agent is placed at a location, it is linked to an agent that is chosen uniformly at random from those already at that location. This ensures the graph remains connected. Second, as in the original model, a number of links is added on every iteration, sufficient to maintain the desired average degree. In this case, when a link is added, the source is chosen uniformly at random from all agents, and the destination is chosen by first choosing an occupied location (weighted according to population), and then selecting uniformly at random one of the agents at that location. If the source does not exist at that location, it expands to that location. This ensures that agents can only link if they share a location, as in the original model.

### 3.2 Adding Cybersecurity to ASIM

We use ASIM to compare the effectiveness of different policy interventions that counter the proliferation of malware infections. For simplicity, we assume that every AS can implement interventions, i.e. we do not focus on ISPs alone. We define insecurity by assigning a *wickedness rate* to each AS: the fraction of machines that are infected with malware. Depending on its size, each AS has a corresponding *wickedness level*: the absolute number of infected machines. Sometimes we will simply refer to wickedness as an abbreviation of wickedness level. We define the wickedness rate  $w_i$  for each AS  $i$  according to the exponential distribution:

$$w_i = \min(-\bar{w} \ln(1 - r_i), 0.5)$$

where  $r_i$  is a value selected uniformly at random from the interval  $[0, 1]$ , and  $\bar{w}$  is the average wickedness. In Section 4 we explain why this distribution is a reasonable match to observed empirical measurements of wickedness.

In ASIM, the *wicked traffic* that flows from a source AS A to a destination AS B is directly proportional to the wickedness level at A. We define the *wicked traffic rate* at B as the fraction of all traffic destined for end users at B that is wicked. Hence we do not count transit traffic when measuring wickedness, although

wicked traffic is passed through the network. We are only interested in the impact of wicked traffic on end users, and so are only concerned with the volume of traffic that reaches the destination.

We model five types of interventions that can be undertaken by each AS:

1. **Do nothing:** This is the baseline where the AS makes no active intervention.
2. **Reduce egress wickedness:** This captures a range of AS interventions that remediate customer infections. The percentage reduction of wicked egress traffic depends on the aggressiveness of the intervention—automated notifications are less successful than quarantine, etc.
3. **Reduce ingress wickedness:** An AS can deploy filters that drop some portion of incoming wicked traffic. The proportion dropped depends on the effectiveness of wicked traffic detection, the capacity of filtering on the routers, and other factors. Ingress filtering can be applied to both end-user traffic and transit traffic.
4. **Reduce egress and ingress wickedness:** An AS can deploy methods 2 and 3 simultaneously.
5. **Blacklist wicked traffic sources:** An AS can drop all traffic originating from known wicked sources, typically dropping all traffic that comes from another AS that is known to have high infection rates. Hence there is collateral damage because legitimate as well as wicked traffic is dropped. We model this by having an AS drop all traffic (both wicked and legitimate) from other ASes with sufficiently high wickedness rates. We also model the notion of an AS being *too big to block*, i.e. an AS will only blacklist smaller ASes because blacklisting large ASes is expected to result in an excessive loss of legitimate traffic.

Another intervention under consideration by policy makers is increased *data sharing*, where an AS learns about infections from an amalgamation of sources. We do not treat data sharing as a separate intervention in the model; rather, we can observe the effect of increased data sharing by increasing the effectiveness of ingress and egress interventions.

Separately, we model which ASes choose to intervene as follows:

1. **Unilateral:** Some ASes choose to intervene unilaterally, and there is no coordination between ASes or regulatory pressure on a particular subset of ASes to intervene. We implement this by

randomly selecting a subset of ASes to adopt intervention strategies.

2. **Large ASes act in concert:** A selection of large ASes together adopt one of the AS-level interventions. There are several variations on this:

- (a) *Global coordination:* All the largest ASes adopt one of the AS-level interventions.
- (b) *Country-specific coordination:* All of the largest ASes in one country adopt one of the AS-level interventions. We implement this in the model by randomly selecting a fraction of the largest ASes to apply interventions.
- (c) *Small AS inclusion:* Smaller ASes also adopt the interventions.

## 4 Validating the Model

The original ASIM [17] was validated on real world data and shown to be a close match on a number of metrics. That work dates from 2006, so we have collected more recent data to perform more extensive validation of the new ASIM. First, we gathered data on the real topology of the AS graph using the standard method of inferring links from BGP dumps, which we collected from the RouteViews<sup>4</sup> and RIPE<sup>5</sup> databases. These data were used to validate ASIM on 12 different graph-based metrics; the results are too extensive to include in this paper.<sup>6</sup>

Second, we gathered data on the distributions of locations among ASes in the real world by matching geoip information from MaxMind<sup>7</sup> with the IP prefixes of ASes collected from the BGP dumps. We used this data to confirm that the characteristics of the geographical distribution of agents in ASIM correspond closely with the real Internet. We also used MaxMind to gather population data for cities matched to locations inferred from the geoip data. We could thus confirm that the characteristics of the population distribution in ASIM closely follow that in the real world.

Obtaining data to validate the cybersecurity extensions to ASIM is a more challenging task. Reliable data are difficult to find for the most important quantity: the distribution of wickedness rates over the ASes. Perhaps the best data comes from a study

<sup>4</sup>[www.routeviews.org](http://www.routeviews.org)

<sup>5</sup>[www.ripe.net](http://www.ripe.net)

<sup>6</sup>Data and tools available at <http://ftg.lbl.gov/projects/asim>.

<sup>7</sup>[www.maxmind.com](http://www.maxmind.com)

by Van Eeten et al. [31] of botnet activity at Dutch ISPs. The authors aggregate data on IP addresses observed to be sending email spam, participating in the Conficker botnet, or appearing in the logs of intrusion detection systems for suspected attack behavior. They found that between 2% and 7% of the customers of the nine largest Dutch ISPs were infected and exhibiting botnet activity.

Van Eeten et al. also collected similar data on global Internet activity, finding that Dutch ISPs experience slightly lower than average rates, with the worst-performing countries experiencing a rate several times higher than that of the Dutch ISPs. However, the authors do not report rates for other countries, because some countries make more extensive use of DHCP than the Netherlands, which could lead to overestimates. To incorporate the potential for higher rates, for our experiments we selected an average wickedness rate  $\bar{w} = 0.1$ , slightly higher than the highest Dutch ISP value.

Although we can derive the average wickedness rate from the Dutch data, we are also interested in how wickedness is distributed across ISPs. To that end, we collected per ISP data from two sources of malicious activities. First, we collected data from [maliciousnetworks.org](http://maliciousnetworks.org), where academic researchers have constructed a system that tallies the level of malicious activity at each AS [30]. They aggregate reports of botnet, phishing and malware servers observed at each AS. Second, we analyzed a single-day snapshot from the SANS Internet Storm Center, which publishes a list of over 1 million IP addresses exhibiting attack behavior<sup>8</sup>. We then determined the AS associated with each IP address in the SANS list and tallied the total number of IP addresses observed at each AS to arrive at measures of wickedness levels for the ASes. Note that in both of these cases, we can determine only wickedness levels, not rates, because the number of customers served by each AS is not publicized.

Figure 1 plots the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of wickedness levels obtained from [maliciousnetworks.org](http://maliciousnetworks.org), the Internet Storm Center, and ASIM. We can see that our use of an exponential distribution for the wickedness levels in ASIM results in a simulated CCDF that falls between the two empirical data sets. From this, we conclude that the method used in ASIM for generating wickedness rates for ASes is reasonable.

Even less data are available to evaluate the effec-




Figure 1: Distribution of wickedness levels generated by ASIM and in two real world data sets. (Normalized)

tiveness of the different policy interventions described in Section 2. To our knowledge, the only data on interventions comes from the same Dutch study mentioned above [31]. The authors surveyed ISPs about how often they notified or quarantined customers infected with malware, and then compared this to their own measurements of wickedness levels. They found that ISPs notified between 1% and 50% of infected customers, and that around 20-25% of this number were also placed into quarantine. As a baseline, in ASIM we assume that standard intervention reduces wicked traffic by 20%, although in Section 5, we also explore the impact of varying the remediation efficacy. We place the different intervention techniques on a continuum: notification is less effective than quarantine, and both can be substantially improved by sharing notifications.

## 5 Experimental Results

We carried out a number of experiments to explore the impact of the various cybersecurity interventions modeled in ASIM. First, in Section 5.1, we investigate the simulation at a single point in time, and second, in Section 5.2 we study the simulation as the network evolves. In both cases, we measure the impact of an intervention as the percentage by which it reduces the wicked traffic rate (as defined in Section 3.2) compared to when no intervention is adopted. When interventions occur, they filter out 20% of wicked traffic, except for blacklisting, where all traffic from a blacklisted AS is dropped, both legitimate and wicked. For all experiments, we used

<sup>8</sup>[http://isc.sans.edu/feeds/daily\\_sources](http://isc.sans.edu/feeds/daily_sources)




Figure 2: The change over time of the complementary cumulative distribution (CCDF) for the average path length between every pair of ASes in the real Internet.

the default parameter settings for ASIM V0.3.<sup>9</sup>

### 5.1 Impact at a Single Instant

For our study of the effect of interventions at a single point in time, we used ASIM to grow a network of 10 000 ASes, and used that network as the basis for all experiments. For each intervention, we started with the same 10 000 AS network, set the parameters appropriately, and ran ASIM for a single time step. The traffic component of ASIM always updates at the end of a run, so this yields a single update of the traffic patterns, changed according to the intervention, and always starting from the same state.

We used 10 000 ASes, rather than the current approximately 34 000 in the real Internet,<sup>10</sup> to reduce the running time of the simulation. This should have no substantive impact on the experimental results because the key characteristics of the AS-level graph do not change significantly as the network grows, either in our simulations or in reality. For example, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of average path lengths has remained roughly unchanged over the last decade, even as the number of ASes has grown more than threefold.

We first examine how applying interventions to different ASes can affect wicked traffic levels. Figure 3 shows how wicked traffic decreases when only the 20 largest ASes (as measured by degree) adopt interventions, as compared to a random selection of between




Figure 3: Impact of interventions on wicked traffic rate. “20 largest” is the effect when the 20 largest ASes intervene; “random  $x\%$ ” is the effect when  $x$  percent of all ASes intervene.

10-30% of all ASes. This illustrates the case where interventions are coordinated at the largest ISPs to a hands-off approach where ISPs decide for themselves whether or not to adopt countermeasures. The graph clearly demonstrates that targeting the largest ASes is a superior strategy, given that targeting just the 20 largest ASes (0.2% of the total) reduces traffic by more than applying interventions to even 3 000 randomly selected ASes.

It is not particularly surprising that targeting the largest ASes is the most effective strategy, given the structure of the AS graph. In our simulations, the largest ASes route up to six orders of magnitude more traffic than the smallest. Nonetheless, the results reinforce the argument that remediation policies can be more successful by focusing on a small group of the largest ASes, unless a majority of all ASes can be persuaded to unilaterally respond.

What is more striking is the comparison between ingress and egress filtering. Filtering ingress traffic destined for end users only (i.e. not filtering transit traffic) is about as effective as filtering egress traffic (around 10% when the largest ASes intervene). Ingress filtering of both end-user and transit traffic at the largest ASes, by contrast, reduces wicked traffic by a factor of 2.7 over egress alone. This is a more surprising finding, as it suggests that filtering incoming wicked traffic is more effective than stopping outgoing traffic. When ASes act unilaterally, the difference is not as large (a factor of 1.8) because the smaller ASes transit less traffic.

<sup>9</sup>av\_degree = 4.2, extent\_cost = 1.5, base\_income = 5, pop\_distr\_exp = -1, wickedness = 0.1.

<sup>10</sup>As of May 2010.




Figure 4: Impact of interventions on wicked traffic rate on those ASes that intervene, and those that do not. “20 largest” is the effect when the 20 largest ASes intervene; “random  $x\%$ ” is the effect when  $x$  percent of all ASes intervene.

Most policy interventions under discussion have focused on ISPs’ remediating customer infections, which is akin to egress filtering. While this does reduce wicked traffic levels, our results suggest that resources might be put to better use by filtering incoming and transit traffic for wickedness.

Figure 4 compares the decrease in wicked traffic at ASes that implement the interventions to the reduction at ASes that do not adopt any interventions. The benefits for non-intervening ASes represent a way to measure the positive externalities of security interventions in the network. As expected, filtering egress traffic creates substantial positive externalities, with non-intervening ASes experiencing similar reductions in wicked traffic rates as intervening ASes. This effect holds for both the largest ASes and a random selection of ASes. By contrast, filtering ingress traffic has positive externalities only if wicked transit traffic is blocked. In this case, the greatest benefits accrue to the intervening ASes. This indicates that when filtering ingress traffic, the incentives for adopting countermeasures are more aligned, and there should be less fear of free-riding.

Furthermore, the positive externalities of ingress filtering (including transit traffic) can vary greatly depending on which ASes intervene. The benefits to non-intervening ASes are more than twice as large when the largest ASes intervene rather than when ASes unilaterally intervene at random. This is because large ASes attract more transit traffic, and so




Figure 5: Effect of the intervention of a fraction of the largest ASes.

their filtering has a greater impact.

Even if having the largest ASes implement an intervention is the preferred strategy for reducing wicked traffic on the Internet, it may not be possible to enlist the support of all ASes. For example, even if all large US-based ISPs adopted ingress and egress filtering, operators in other countries might choose not to participate. To investigate the impact of incomplete adoption, Figure 5 explores how varying the proportion of large ASes that participate in the intervention affects the reduction of malicious traffic.

Although wicked traffic falls as more ASes participate, the effect is non-linear. For example, the differences between 80% and 100% of ASes intervening are not great (from 27% to 30% wicked traffic reduction, an 11% change), whereas the differences between 60% and 80% are much greater (from 21% to 27%, a 29% change). This suggests that country-level interventions are much more likely to be effective if they include the majority of large ASes. For example, if the all the largest ISPs based in the US were to intervene, that would constitute at least 75% of all large ASes.

In all the experiments reported previously, the ingress and egress filtering effectiveness was set at 20%. However, some interventions are likely to be more effective than others. Notification-based schemes will filter less egress wicked traffic than active quarantine, and increased data sharing could raise the success rate of both ingress and egress filtering. It is very difficult to get reliable information on the efficacy of these different approaches. Instead, in Figure 6 we explore how different combinations of values for the success rates of ingress and egress filtering af-




Figure 6: How the wicked traffic rate falls when varying the success rate of ingress and egress filtering. The scale indicates on the right the reduction in wicked traffic, from 0 to 40%.

fect the wicked traffic rates. Ingress filtering is consistently more effective at reducing overall wickedness. For instance, ingress filtering 35% of wicked traffic and no egress traffic reduces the wicked traffic rate by the same amount as 20% ingress and 40% egress filtering.

We also study the more aggressive intervention of completely blocking all traffic originating from blacklisted ASes with unacceptably high wicked traffic rates. Blacklisting results in a trade-off between reducing wicked traffic and collateral damage caused by blocking innocent traffic. We consider only the case where interventions are carried out by the 20 largest ASes (those of degree  $\geq 170$ ), because, as seen previously, interventions are most successful when the largest ASes act in concert.

There are two choices to make when applying blacklisting: first, the selection of the level of wickedness above which ASes are blacklisted, and second, the selection of whether to not blacklist larger ASes. We explore three levels of AS size: blacklisting all ASes above the wickedness level, or those of degree  $< 170$ , or those of degree  $< 10$ . For each choice of AS size, we select levels of wickedness that result in losses of legitimate (good) traffic of 2%, 5%, 10% and 15%.

Figure 7 shows that the best strategy when applying blacklisting depends very much on the level of legitimate traffic loss we are willing to tolerate. For very low losses (2%) the strategies have similar results. For more moderate losses (5%), we should




Figure 7: Trade-off between reducing wicked traffic and losing legitimate traffic when blacklisting.

blacklist all but the 20 largest ASes. Beyond that, it is more effective to blacklist all ASes. However, we see diminishing returns as the level of acceptable loss increases. For example, when blacklisting all ASes, a 50% increase in acceptable loss, from 10% to 15%, only reduces the wicked traffic by an additional 23%.

In fact, increasing the level of acceptable loss does not always reduce wicked traffic. As can be seen in Figure 8, the largest reduction of wicked traffic happens around a wickedness level of 0.08. Furthermore, there is a range over which the wicked traffic reduction changes little; thus, the best choice of wickedness level would probably be around 0.12 for this example; anything lower increases the loss of legitimate traffic with no beneficial wicked traffic reduction.

## 5.2 Impact on Network Growth

The effect of malicious activity on the growth of the AS network is a complex issue, one that we do not have the space to investigate in depth in this paper. As an illustration of some of the potential for modeling chronic attacks in ASIM, we briefly consider how the cost of intervention influences network growth. Blacklisting is the simplest intervention to incorporate into the economics of ASIM, because ASes earn money according to how much traffic they route. Blacklisting reduces the amount of traffic (both legitimate and wicked) seen by ASes and hence should change the evolution of the network.

We carried out experiments where the 20 largest ASes intervene to blacklist all traffic originating from ASes of degree less than 170. We set the wickedness level for blacklisting to be 0.18, which results in mod-




Figure 8: The reduction in wicked traffic and the loss of legitimate (good) traffic when blacklisting all ASes of degree  $< 170$ .




Figure 9: Change wicked traffic and loss of legitimate traffic over time as the network grows from 5 000 to 13 000 ASes. The wicked traffic rate is the percentage of all traffic that is wicked.

erate legitimate traffic loss. At this level, according to Figure 7, the best strategy is to blacklist all sufficiently wicked ASes of degree less than 170.

Figure 9 shows how wicked traffic and lost legitimate traffic change as the network evolves from 5 000 to 13 000 ASes. The wicked traffic increases slightly (by about 9%) and the lost legitimate traffic decreases significantly (by about 66%). To understand why this happens, consider two classes of ASes: those that lose incoming traffic due to blacklisting (class A) and those that do not (class B). In ASIM, every AS depends on traffic for revenue, and so ASes in class A will earn less and hence grow more slowly than ASes in class B. The ASes in class A will have reduced levels of wicked traffic and increased levels of lost legitimate traffic compared to those in class B. Thus, as ASes in class B grow more than those in class A, the overall level of wicked traffic will increase, and the overall level of legitimate traffic lost will decrease. This is exactly what we see in Figure 9.

Although blacklisting tends to promote ASes that receive more wicked traffic, the rate at which wicked traffic increases is much slower than the rate at which lost legitimate traffic decreases. Hence, blacklisting could still be considered a viable strategy for reducing overall wickedness, at least in the short term. Persuading individual ASes to voluntarily adopt blacklisting, however, would be hard. Mandatory participation would likely be necessary.

## 6 Related Work

Few studies have modeled the costs and benefits of intervention to prevent the spread of malware across a network. LeLarge [19, 20] used an agent-based model to investigate the economics of interventions that counter the spread of malware. However, LeLarge’s model is much more abstract than ASIM: agents exist on a random network, over which there is a probabilistic spread of infections. Agents can choose either to secure themselves (at a cost) or to remain unsecured and risk loss. There is no notion of geography or traffic. Varian [34] proposed a game-theoretic model to understand how security impacts the decisions of other rational actors, but without considering network topology or how infections may spread. Subsequently, a number of authors [26, 5] have proposed models of computer-infection spread that combine game theory with network topology. These models focus on optimal strategies to combat a binary state of infection.

By contrast, a number of models have been developed to explore the spread of malware, such as computer worms [14]. Compartmental models of disease spread (whether biological or electronic) are attractive methods for investigating the progress of epidemics [4]. For example, Ajelli et al. describe the spread of a botnet using such a model [1]. Other work incorporates additional factors into differential equation models, such as locations based on time zone [12] and peer-to-peer protocols [29]. These approaches fo-

cus on the spread of a single type of malware, such as a particular worm or botnet. By contrast, our approach is to model all malware in a generic way, incorporating both the economics of interventions, and the way interventions affect the spread of malicious traffic on the Internet topology at the AS level.

A major difference between agent-based models, such as ASIM, and differential equation models, such as those described above, is that the latter assume that populations are ‘well-mixed’; consequently they do not capture the effect of skewed network topologies. Various extensions, such as percolation methods and generating functions [25], have been proposed as a method for overcoming this limitation, spawning a great deal of interest in epidemics on network topologies [15]. Other extensions include using packet-level data generated by computer network traffic simulators [35]. In addition to investigating the spread of malware across network topologies, mitigation strategies such as quarantining malicious hosts [22, 27, 11] have been investigated. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that use these models to investigate intervention policies at the ISP or Internet-level.

## 7 Discussion

ASIM simplifies many aspects of routing on the real Internet. For example, traffic in ASIM always follows the shortest path, whereas real traffic is also influenced by agreements between ASes, following various conventions such as the “valley free” rule. In ASIM ASes earn money from all traffic they route, whereas in reality ASes earn money from their customers and pay their own upstream providers. But we found in preliminary investigations that these added complexities do not improve the accuracy of the model, at least in terms of measures such as average path length, degree distribution, etc. More detailed modeling is a topic for future research and may lead to have implications for the study of policy interventions.

Other model enhancements would allow us to study more carefully the impact of interventions on the economics of network growth. We have presented a simple initial approach, using blacklisting, but in future we intend to explore other aspects, such as the cost of carrying out various interventions. Blacklisting is simple in that packets from a particular source are dropped, whereas filtering only wicked traffic would likely be much more expensive, requiring a sophisticated intrusion detection system (IDS). Because of the performance requirements, it may be infeasible to

filter traffic using an IDS at the level of the powerful routers used in the largest ASes. In this case, blacklisting and improving end-user security may be the only reasonable options.

In our experiments with network growth, we kept the level of wickedness, or compromised hosts, constant. This is clearly unrealistic as the number of compromised hosts changes over time as some are cleaned up and others infected. Furthermore, we expect that the amount of wicked traffic reaching end-users will also influence infection rates. It is difficult to find good data on how these rates change over time, and so it will be difficult to validate a model that captures these aspects. One topic for future research is to model dynamic wickedness levels, perhaps following an epidemiological model where there is some rate of recovery from infection, and some rate of reinfection, which is to some degree dependent on wicked traffic flow.

## 8 Conclusions

The results of our experiments using ASIM indicate that when filtering wicked traffic, the best targets for intervention are a small group of the largest ASes. Specifically, we find that intervention by the top 0.2% of ASes (in terms of size) is more effective than intervention by a randomly chosen subset of 30% of all ASes. However, we show that this efficacy rapidly drops off if less than three quarters of that top 0.2% intervene. This is an issue of importance if not all the largest ASes fall within the same regulatory domain, such as a nation-state.

Our experiments also illustrate the relative effectiveness of filtering ingress and egress traffic. We show that filtering ingress traffic (including transit) is more than twice as effective as filtering egress traffic alone. Unsurprisingly, the effect of filtering is felt most strongly by those actively filtering the data, although positive externalities can be seen if outgoing or transit traffic is filtered. In our model, filtering egress traffic is also a proxy for end-user remediation, which suggests that the current focus on cleaning up ISP customers is not the most effective strategy.

In the case of blacklisting, we show that the choice of which ASes should be exempt from blacklisting depends on how much legitimate traffic loss we are willing to tolerate. If moderate levels of legitimate traffic loss are acceptable, then large ASes should be exempt; however, if higher levels of traffic loss are acceptable all ASes should be eligible for blacklisting. The threshold for which ASes are blacklisted does not

relate linearly to the reduction in the wicked traffic rate. This is likely due to attrition of good traffic, raising the fraction of wicked traffic seen.

Our investigations of the impact of interventions on the evolution of the network are brief and are limited to modeling the effect of blacklisting traffic on growth. We show that blacklisting traffic results in a gradual increase in wicked traffic, and a more rapid reduction in the loss of legitimate traffic. Although this is beneficial in the short term, in the long-term those ASes that profit most from wicked traffic will prosper at the expense of more secure ASes, and so global effectiveness will decline.

We believe that the results reported in this paper are a good proof-of-concept demonstration of how agent-based modeling can be useful to policy makers when considering different interventions. We hope in future that our approach will provide additional interesting results and tools to help policy makers determine the best way to respond to the growing malware threat.

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